This article first examines the relationship betweent he postmodern deconstruction of representation and recent post-truth politics.I td iscusses to what extent the" hyperreality of simulacra" (Baudrillard)h as become an instrument of power in recent autocratic policies.Inreturn, it exploresanalternative way of thinking of "the real."The basic thesis is that the real has its own force.Therefore,itisable to represent itself, that is,to reject certain signs as well as to demand them. However, the concept of representation proposed here does not fall back on the separation of subject and object typical for classical representation theory.A ccordingly,t he real is not to be understood as an objective counterpart to which we direct ourselves. Rather, it is ac ontinuousf ounding process, more precisely,asurplus movementthat lets us and all beings be.Bygenetically flowing through all things,i ta llows them to showt hemselves from themselves,t hus counteracting the distortions tied to their appearing like ab ad but unavoidable counterweight. 
Modernism and Postmodernity
As Pericles Lewis suggests in his Cambridge Introduction to Modernism,the crisis of representation is in the first place an aesthetic problem.
1 Since Romanticism at the latest, 2 words and images have stopped simply depictingreality.Instead, they 1L ewis,Pericles,"Introduction", in Lewis,Pericles (ed.) , The Cambridge Introduction to Modernism,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press 2007, 3-10. becomeincreasingly self-referential by reflectingtheir depicting function. That is, the meaningofwords and images is no longer generated by an "external" reference,but ratherbythe fact that they refer to each other,and they in turn represent this relationship. Georg Lukµcs alreadydiagnosedthe problems associated with this in his Theory of the Novel of 1920:"We have inventedthe creationofforms: and that is why everything that fallsfrom our weary and despairing hands must alwaysbeincomplete." 3 Poststructuralist theory-from Saussure to Barthes,B audrillard, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard, to name only the most prominent names -t ook up this specificity of modern literature and art most profoundly and continuedi tb y transferring it to theoretical thinking.Inthis essay Iwill refermainly to Foucault and Derrida. In The Order of Things,for example,F oucault explicitly places his archaeology in the line of MallarmØspoetry. 4 Alongthis line he advances to the actual coretopic of his study, namely how language,inthe course of the Classical age and up to the 19 th century,isnolonger linked to signification, but rather to representationa nd discursivity;w hile in the 20 th century it also loses its connectiontorepresentation and becomes fragmented. 5 Derrida, for his part,a lso maintains as trong relationshipw ith literary modernism.B esides MallarmØ,h is reference authors include Artaud, Blanchot, Celan, Char, and Kafka.U nder the auspices of diffØrance,h ee stablishes that "signs represent the present in its absence;they take the place of the present;" 6 in such away that signscontinually and persistently refer to more signs, while these signs again refer to yet other signs,a nd so on. Thus,w hat lies outside of signs, appears only as something withdrawn within signs referring to each other.
Within postmodern theory,the notion of the crisis of representation becomes even more complex because it offers both ac omprehensive category of interpretation as wellasserving as acritical instrument. As a category of interpretation, the "crisis of representation" not only transforms the problem of modern aestheticsinto aformal problem that has to do with the theory of signs or discourse theory. Rather, it appliest he aesthetic and formal theoretical problem to the modern way of life in general. From this perspective,the modern order of life is fundamentally characterized by acrisis of representation that extendsf rom the individual relationship witht he world to the political system of government. Baudrillard perhaps addressed this most consistently whens peakingo facom-prehensive "substitution of the real with signs of the real"orofa"hyper-realityof simulacra."
By contrast, the "crisis of representation" serves as a criticalinstrument where it is used to question or even delegitimize modern subjectivity.One can think here of Derridasc riticism of "Western logocentrism" and "the metaphysics of presence." In return, he emphasizes language as ac ontinuous processo fs hifts of meaning.O ro ne can think again of Foucault, who analyzes subjectivity as a specific game of signsorganized by power. Subjectivity,once the promoter of the proud Enlightenment project, turns out to be am ere ensemble of knowledge, normsa nd self-practices that in itself lacks any substantiality.T he historical a priori of discourse replaces the transcendental-subjective apriori, valid from Kant to Husserl.
Ugly Grimaces
It can hardly be denied that the "crisis of representation" was successfula sa criticalinstrument, especially when it comes to processes of decolonization and the dismantlingo fg ender hierarchies.Y et at present it may seem that this has come to an end, more precisely as if the critical forces of the crisis of representation have just exhaustedthemselves.Here Ideliberately do not address the currents ituation of postcolonials tudieso rg ender discourse,f or this would require adifferentiated discussion of its own.
7 Instead, let us stick to the sphere of simple andrelatively unmediated power, that is,the sphere of political power. In his 1995 essay Theorie des Ideologischen (Theory of the Ideological) Wolfgang Fritz Haug, who,f rom aM arxist position, remained critical of postmodern discourset hroughout, speakso ft he "age of digitalp rocessing" as the "Berlusconi age […] ,inwhich the media power is finally preparing to diminish the reality of the referent into aconnotationofthe imaginary." 8 In Haugssense,one could say that with Berlusconi the crisis of representation comes true completely,for it has now seized power over the political and social status quo.T he reason for this is that those who have the unconditional "will to power" have appropriated the crisis of representation and turned it into astrategy for their ownbenefit. They have learned that the only thing that matters is to impose signs -w ordsa nd 7A sgood examples see Seeßlen,Georg, "Semantical Healing", in Postmoderne,Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag 1995, 47 (42-63). images, and their spectacular mØlange-against othersigns.There is no outside of signs,for the opposition between thesignified and the signifier has long since been deconstructed. What may lie beyond significationisstrangely reminiscentofthe medieval concept of prime matter. Having no features of its own, neither impetus nor effect, it can be relentlessly deployedfor power-strategic purposes.Following Giorgio Agambens Homo Sacer project, we can say:this is the "mere life" of us all, this is our zoe.
Tw enty years afterHaugsessay, Berlusconism has reachedthe heightsofworld politics.I nl ine with his politicso f" alternative facts," US President Trump has ceased to follow the imperative of credibility,respectability,and decency,which used to be bindingfor the heads of representative democracies.Other autocrats such as Putin or the boards of the major sports associationsIOC and FIFAhave never cared about democratic procedures anyway.H owever, their audacityh as also reached anew level.Just think of how the IOC and the Russian state power under Putin dealt with the Russian doping problem during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi;not to mentionother cases of ubiquitous corruption. What is disturbing is that thelies of these actors are well documented in the media and yet they continue to act as if nothinghad ever been documented. In continuation of anotherm otive from Agamben, this time from his commentary on St. Pauls Letter to the Romans,o ne can speak hereo fasuspension or depositioning (Entsetzung), namely of adepositioning of lie (Entsetzung der Lüge): Tr ump and Putin and othersl ie as if they were not lying; only that this depositioning has nothing to do with am essianic crisis ofp ower. On the contrary,i ts erves as an unreserved exhibition of entirely mundane power with all its presumptuousness and ruthlessness. Therefore,linguist Ruth Wodak is right whenshe states that our age is less a"post-factual age" than an "age of shamelessness": "Shameless lies are brought into the world […] withoutnegative sanctions, even withoutapologies."
9
In other words,w ea re in as ituation where truth claimsa re simply ignored, because apparently,they can be simply ignored.
It would undoubtedlybetoo simplistic to assume (as somedoorhave already done) that poststructuralism is the ideology of neoliberal capitalism, which in theory dismantlesa ll obligations in order to unleash the unrestricted play of powers and forces in practice.N evertheless,i ts eems that poststructuralist discourse has contributed to the age of shamelessness by rejecting, like the current autocrats,all claimstotruth in favor of apractice of depositioning. Iamthinking here once again of Derridasearly "affirmationofthe play of the world […],the affirmation of signsw ithout fault, without truth" 10 ,a sw ell as his later, often repeated proclamation of the abysmalseparationfrom truth, according to which every presumed truth is at best ad eceptive surface phenomenon. One can also 9W odak, Ruth, "Die Medien haben Kurz mitgemacht",i n: FALTER 51-52/2017, own translation. 10 Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference,London /New York, Routledge2005, 369.
Becoming RealinanAge of Shameless Lies
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 think of Foucaultsreplacementoftruth by "games of truth", which are not about "the discovery of true things but the rulesaccording to which what asubject can say about certain things depends on the question of true and false."
11 But what about those subjects who consciouslypreferthe false to the true?From Foucaults perspective,there is nothing to preventthe answer:theyre not lying, theyre just changing the ruleso ft he game on their own accord. In ar emarkable way they resemble the subject of Foucaultslater philosophy,asubject that transforms itself in such away that "it cannot find itself again in aform that can be described as the effect of an external power."
12 Dontw em eet here exactly the contemporary autocrats who,a fter many personal transformations,a re finally independent of any external power?One might thinkofthe winding lives of aPutin or Trump. There is much to suggest that characters like these two have every right to feel like the sovereign masterso fa n" aesthetic of existence;" hardly according to the intention of postmodern theory,but still accordingtothe result.
Faced with these masters of the world and theirs hameless lies,Ib elieveiti s time to reinvigorate ad iscourse of truth. Tr uth here is primarily not to be understood as aformal-semanticproblem, or amatter of truth-apt statements,but as something that concerns the core of human life.I no ther words,f rom the perspective suggested here, truth is only in as econdary sensea ne pistemological category but basically an ethicalone. This is actually not so far removed from Foucaults" parrhesia."H owever,I would like to add amaterial element, while Foucaultsapproach remains merely formal. Since truth has to do with what is really the case,adiscourse of truth is inevitably linked to adiscourseofreality.Indeed, one can say that truth can only be thought of under the conditiono fastrongn otion of reality.R eality is to be understood accordingly as that which exceeds all relativizations.
In the following Iw ould like to outline elements of such ad iscourse that progressively binds truth and reality together. In contrast to poststructuralism, the basic thesis is that the real cannot be substituted by signs. Rather, according to this approach, the real has its own force; because it has its own force,i ti sa ble to represent itself,i.e.toreject certain signs as well as to demand them. Theethical dimension of truth relates to this claim for appropriate signs. There is an imperative of the real. Thereal demands us to be true;true in athreefold sense:inthe sense of fidelity,precision,and sincerity.
Note that from this perspective,the representation -"true signs" -that the real demands of us lies before the separation of subject and object, which applies to classical representation theory.Accordingly,the real is not to be understood as an 11 Foucault, M ichel, "Foucault", i objective counterpart to whom we direct ourselves.Rather, we should conceive of it as amovement that lets us be,just like all things, by leadingusbeyond whatwe are at present in adynamic verticalsense.Infact, the real is so little at our disposal that in the final analysis,itcould be said that false signs make us perish in the flow of the real, while true signs will save us.
The EmperorsNew Clothes
Let us start with an exemplary case,namely Hans ChristianAndersensfairy tale The EmperorsNew Clothes,which is actually aparable.Theresanemperor who loves beautiful clothes.One day two fraudsters come to the city and promise him clothesofexquisite quality.However, they say whoever is stupid or unfitfor their office cannot see the clothes.T he emperoro rders the clothes immediately,n ot least to test his highest officials.T he fraudsters begin to weavet he supposed clothes, but they take the silk provided for this purpose themselves and weave with nothing. Since the clothesconsist of nothing, neither the officials,who are to supervise the progress of the work, nor the emperorhimself can see the clothes. But since neither of them wants to be considered stupid or incapable,they dont admit this.Rather, they pretend to be enthusiastic about the beauty of the clothes. To break the spell of deception, which is supported by everyone,itfinally takesa little child;"the voice of the innocent [den uskyldiges røst],"asAndersenwrites. During the public presentation of the emperorsnew clothes,the child exclaims: "But he has nothing on at all [men han har jo ikke noget på.]!" Andersensfairy tale ends with al iteral and very democraticu ncoveringo fthel ogic of power: "But he has nothingonatall! cried the whole people at last.That made adeep impression upon the emperor, for it seemedtohim that they were right;but he thoughttohimself, Now Imust bear up to the end. And the chamberlains walked with still greater dignity,asifthey carried the train which did not exist." 13 Andersensfairy tale very clearly refutes Foucaultsassumption that it is games of truth that decide what is true or false and what exists or does not exist accordingly.Ofcourse, the fraudsters who weave with nothing and pass off the result of their weaving art as something are playing ag ame of truth. They create a situation of speech -of"veridiction", as Foucault calls it -inwhich the emperor, his officials and at first also the people declare existent what does notexist.Y et this truth game,which is actually about deception and self-deception,cannot be persevered. However,the reasonisnot, as the late Foucault apparently assumes, 13 In Andersensoriginal text, it reads:"Han har jo ikke nogetpå!råbte til sidst hele folket. Og det krøb ikejseren, thi han syntes,dehavde ret, men han taenkte som så: nu må jeg holde processionen ud.Ogsåholdt han sig endnu stoltere,ogkammerherrerne gik og bar på slaebet, som der slet ikke var."A ndersen, Hans-Christian: The EmperorsN ew Suit.
Becoming RealinanAge of Shameless Lies
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 that individual members of society change in such away that the rules of the game of truth also change.Rather, the situation changes abruptly in Andersensfairy tale and through an interventionfrom the outermost edge of society,where other games,not truth games,are played. From the perspective of the child,the socially constituted meanings are irrelevant. They collapse in on themselves and the truth emerges:the emperor is naked. There are no new clothes.
There can be no doubt that the case from Andersensfairy tale is avery simple case,and there are undoubtedly cases that are not so easy to resolve.The question of what gender designationsr eallyr efer to is ag ood example.I ti st herefore advisable to distinguish exactly from case to case.Nevertheless,there seemstobe an excessive remainder, an overflowing surplus of the real, even in cases that are overdetermined by ag ame of truth, so to speak,a nd where meanings seem to result solely from discursive construction.F or instance,a nd to stick to the example,when peoplecannot bear their gender role,when they suffer from it, and at least know "Imnot awoman/Imnot aman."
Let me pursue this thought. In fact, the question of the real seemstobeexactly about this surplus.Itissomething that evades signs and meanings;yet it aims at the sign, the true sign,toshow that it itself,the real,isthere.The next section will focus on three aspects of ap henomenology of the real to support this notion.
AShort Phenomenology of the Real
Is peak of ap henomenologyo ft he real because,f ollowing Heideggerse arly fundamental ontology, or hermeneutic phenomenology, Ia ssume that what we are dealingwith, the "things" or phenomena, is "that which shows itself in itself" 14 and accordingly "shows itself from itself."
15 It is another mattert hat phenomenological thinking, including Heidegger, has not adequatelyaddressedthe selfgiving of phenomena for al ong time.J ean-Luc Marionsw ritings have seminal significance not least against this background.
Three aspectst hen. First aspect: As noted, under the wrong discursive conditions,t he real appears as an excessive remainder, an overflowing surplus.A primary indicator of this is that the real appears as resistance against what misses the real itself,beitthe wrong discourse or the wrong interpretation or the wrong sign. It followsf rom this resistance that the wrong is always connected with an effort. Thewrong mustconstantly assert itself against the resistance of the real, and this constant coercion to ignore whatisreal is eating away at the wrong or at those who support it. One could certainly show this,a lbeit in am ore detailed discussion, for the wrong that arises from lack of wit or inattentiveness.T he simplest and clearest example,however, is exactly whatinterests us,namely lies. 14 Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time,Oxford, Blackwell 2001, 51. 15 Heidegger, Being and Time,58; my emphasis. In this case we can even refer to Nietzsche,who wroteabout the lie in Human, All TooH uman: "Whyd op eople almost always tell the truth in everyday life?-Certainly not because agod has forbidden lying. But […] because it is easier;for lies inquire inventiveness, dissimulation, and memory […] anyone who tells alie seldom notices the heavy burden that he has taken on;inorder to maintain alie, he mustinvent twentyothers."
16 Theforce of the real extends to the point where lies make people sick.People suffer psychophysically fromlies,especially if they support the lies against their own will. Or, to name anothercase,political tyranny with its dishonesty and compulsiontoconceal destroys entire societies.
Ther esistance of the real is important not least because it contradicts the poststructuralist reductionism of all that concerns us into the signifier.T he resistanceofthe real against the lie shows:something is pervading our lives, which is not constituted by signs.Rather, it works independently in the signs,also in such a way that it works against the signs when they distort it. Thetrace is not, as Derrida suggests,"the origin of the origin" of what was actually never there. 17 Rather,it indeed pointstosomething;something one can even call the "thing itself."
However,-the second aspect -how should we understand the "thingitself"? In fact, Ia gree with Derrida and otherst hat as imple metaphysics of presence is misleading. This refers both to thenotion that our ideas are based on fixed things or substancesaswellasthat the real is what is fullyindicated by concepts.Iwill expand on the relationship of the real to concepts in the last section. Let us noteat this juncturethat the resistance of the real nevertheless points to the fact that what appears to us -the phenomenal, the phenomena -has a"self". On the one hand, the self standsfor the fact that what is given to us -orrather, what has given itself to us -isnot arbitrary or interchangeable.Anexample ex negativo: Only abad language,the language of clichØ,describes one phenomenon in such away that it cannot be distinguished from the other.Onthe other hand, the resistance of the real indicates that hermeneutics is limited. One phenomenon cannot be all that an interpretation requires of it. Rather, thereisalimit to what aphenomenon can be; even if "we do not even know what ab ody can do" 18 or whatt he limit of the phenomenon is.The limit is determined by the phenomenonitself.T orefer once again to Andersensparable:what is woven of nothing will never be adress; even if theremay be ways -ways of seeking onesown advantage,rather than artistically showing the invisible -tostage it as adress.
One can conclude from this that the self of phenomena is characterized by its own insistence.I no ther words,p henomena insist on themselves,w hile giving themselves.T hey can never be completely appropriated.T his insistence also implies that phenomena can hold out, that they cannotbedestroyed by falsetruth games.Rather, they can only be repressed, covered up,orsuppressed.
Accordingly,one could say that phenomena in the wakeofinsistence also have acertain consistencyand continuity.Thus,even if it is not true that phenomena are based on or refertofixed substances,one can speakofthem as specific somethings in the senset hat phenomenaa ppear to us as manifestations of the history of a consistent movement.
If it was said above that the real is amovementthat points us,orrather, beings in general beyond themselves in avertical sense,this can be specified here.T he reality of something is the movement of its realization -inconstant struggle with the distortionst hat are part of the process of appearing.T he future of this movement is open to us,y et it is not arbitrary.T hat is,i ti st he future of this appearing thing, of this very phenomenon. However, the impulse for how the phenomenon appearsl ies with the phenomenoni tself.I ti st he impulse of its realization beyond itself.Therefore,wecan never dispose of aphenomenon.
This implies that aphenomenon may suddenly turn out to be different, even in ar adical sense.T he real bringsa bout an abundanceo fc onsistent yet changing, even eventful phenomenal effects that neither we nor,for that matter, anonymous systemsofsignification can ever fullyexploit. While for us this is an indication of the surplus character of the real, every event, even unforeseen transformation, is consistent within the framework of the history of realization of the real.
The thirda spect is relatedt ot his.I tw ould not be enough to understand the insistence,consistencyand continuity of phenomena purelynegatively as something that shows itself in resistance againstfalse truth games.Rather,phenomena have their own impetus.Even on the level of immediate aisthesis,which is poor in interpretation, it can be seen that phenomena are guiding actiono nt heir own initiative.Their form and material imply aproject (Entwurf)that can considerably expand our possibilities for action. Yeti ta lso specifies what these possibilities look like.Note in passing that Heideggersfamous Zeuganalyse of Being and Time significantly ignorest his pointb ecause it places toom uch emphasis on human practical circumspection (Umsicht); apoint to which neo-realist authors such as MarkusG abriel or Graham Harman have also referred.
19 However, if we can reasonably assumethat phenomena have their ownimpetus and project, and that they demand certain actions,i ti so bvious that they also demand certain signs; signs that do justice to them.I ti sb ecause of this demanding impetus of phe-nomenat hat words can have liberating or even redemptive power. In the following Iwill speak of the solving (lösende)qualityofwords,which echoes both their liberating and redemptive power.
The Solving Word and the Dynamics of the Real
Again,wecan think back to Andersen. Thecry of the child "he has nothing on at all" abruptly ends both deceit and self-deception. However hard the chamberlains try to keep up the lie -nomatter how much dignitythey show while carrying the non-existent train-the real has found the solving word (daslösende Wort). Importantly,t he searching for and finding of the solving word originates from the real itself.Andersen showsthis in an exemplary way.The child pronouncing the solving word has not been looking for it. Preciselyb ecause it is innocent, as Andersen writes,itreveals the real without claiming anything, let alone the truth of truth games.Accordingly,one could say that the childisnot asubject of speech. Rather, it is the medium of the searching of the real for the solving word. This is essential to distinguish it from Foucaultsveridiction.
My reservationsconcerning the traditional metaphysics of presencecan also be specified by recourse to the solving word. Thecrucial point seems to be that it is not ac oncept. Concepts resemble signs in that they treat phenomena as substitutable.Concepts,for their part, apply ageneral form to phenomena that turns them into cases among others.Bycontrast, the solving word refers to phenomena as individuals that cannot be substituted. Consequently,t he solving word is not supratemporal as concepts pretend to be.Rather,itisrelated to the real, insofar as the real is coming to be in time.The solving word gives presence to the phenomena in the sense that they can show themselves from themselves.Thus,itreleases them from thoseg ames of truth that distort them. However,t his is still relatedt o temporality.The solving word indicatesthat phenomena can be transient and yet truthful. Phenomena are truthful in that, in finite situations, they can find the signs that allow them to show themselvesfrom themselves.
This relationship of signs,phenomenaand timealso has consequences for the relationship between the solving word and games of truth.The solving word never completely leaves thetruth games behind. It takes place among them and thus it remains revisable;not because it becomes untrue, but because it itself creates a new truth game.Toput it more simply:The solving word opens adifferent view of the world,itcreatesanew situation.Y et in this new situation there will be other distorted realities searching for the true sign or solving word. There is no complete transparency under the finite circumstancesinwhich we live.However, this is not to relativize reality and truth. It simply means that therei sn ot otal, all-encompassing representation of the real.
Reality is asurplusmovement (Überschussbewegung), thankstowhich single phenomena can showthemselves from themselves as undistorted;that is,against the distortions that are the rule in aworld without complete transparency. This also implies ad emand on us that we can speak.T he real calls for the transformation of ourselves in such away that we move into the position of the medium;that we take on passage-like agency, creatingspace for phenomenatoshow themselves from themselves.W eare called to devotiontophenomena, to accuracy and precision, while we are dealing with them. Thepoint is to enter into the dynamics of the real under conditionsthat tend to be dominated by the fascination of that which is woven of nothing, of empty signs,inaword, the unreal.W emust begin creating processes of the real.
